Abstract
In the United Kingdom, the transmission between policy promises and statutes is assumed to be both rapid and efficient because of the tradition of party discipline, relative stability of government, absence of coalitions and the limited powers of legislative revision in the second chamber. Even in the UK, the transmission is not perfect since legislative priorities and outputs are susceptible to changes in public opinion or media coverage, unanticipated events in the external world, backbench rebellions, changes in the political parties and the practical constraints of administering policies or programmes. This paper investigates the strength of the connection between executive priorities and legislative outputs measured by the Speech from the Throne and Acts of Parliament from 1911 to 2008. These are categorised according to the policy content coding system of the UK Policy Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org.uk). Time series cross-sectional analyses show that there is transmission of the policy agenda from the speech to acts. However, the relationship differs by party, strengthening over time for Conservative governments and declining over time for Labour and other governments.
Political systems operate in time. Policy-making follows an institutionalized sequence as decisions proceed from agenda-setting to implementation, but this process is not continuous. The political process has moments in the political cycle, such as State of the Union addresses or party manifestos prior to an election, when decisions and agendas are aggregated and priorities are established. While there is much in public policy that is fluid, institutional rules create junctures that structure the agenda and force decision-makers to establish priorities.
Almost all political systems have these decision points, which are designed to provide information to the public and to send signals to other parts of the political system, such as bureaucracies. These arenas shape the sequence of institutional decision-making as well as subsequent action. The policy priorities fixed during these periods act as a means of agenda-setting and credible commitment where political parties or governments commit to a particular course of action, encouraging them to follow through on their agenda by implementing policies. Because governments are faced with a multitude of pressures and problems, each deserving of some level of attention, decision-makers -with finite attention and resources -must prioritise some issues ahead of others (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) . Through such decision points governments are able to set the agenda establishing the priorities they letter plan to act on through policy. Agendasetting by governments entails some correspondence between the priorities of the stated agenda and subsequent policy outputs, including legislation. Decision-makers therefore select issues for attention with the intention of acting upon them.
Statements of priorities enable governments to enact political mandates and programmes (e.g. Budge and Hofferbert 1992 , Kingermann et al 1994 , Budge et al 2001 , MacDonald and Budge 2005 and take credit for delivering their stated agenda.
Priorities established by party programmes are transmitted into government spending and legislative outputs in both the US and Western Europe (see Budge and Hofferbert 1990; 1992; Bara 2005) . There is evidence, however, that the policy priorities of such party programmes have become more fragmented over time as well as exhibiting uneven patterns of change and stability (see Green-Pedersen 2007; Walgrave and Nuytemans 2009 ).
The expectation is that when governments use these decision points to set out their priorities and policy programmes, they do so with the intention of matching them with attention to the same issues in other institutional domains, such as legislation.
The act of agenda-setting therefore precedes programme enactment and other outputs of government. However, governments respond to broad and often unrelated concerns, such as crime, health and the economy, and these can change in priority as new issues land on the agenda. The allocation of attention on the government agenda is therefore a stochastic process, where randomness and uncertainty are inherent to decision-making because of the complexity of the policy environment (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, pp. 115-116) . Implementation or bureaucratic control problems may bedevil the ability of governments to follow through on their agendas and it may make sense to revise its priorities in response to new issues, policy solutions or emergencies. The transmission from policy priorities to policy outputs should therefore be less than one-to-one in most political systems, but there nevertheless should be a noticeable connection between the two.
We use the United Kingdom (UK) as the case for exploring the transmission of executive priorities into legislative outputs. The UK is a unitary, majoritarian political system with few veto points making it a good general case for the analysis of government agendas and programmes (Lijphart 1984; Tsebelis 1995 This paper takes the following structure. First, it discusses the political and institutional function of the Speech from the Throne, the likelihood of transmission from speech (priorities) to acts (outputs) and the importance of credible commitment from policy priorities and promises from which it formulates two hypotheses. The paper then introduces the data and presents the results of time series cross-sectional analyses. Finally, it discusses these results and draws implications for the study of government agendas.
The Institutional Structure of Decision-Making -From Priorities to Outputs
In many political systems the head of state or head of government delivers an annual formal statement, on behalf of the executive, setting out the government agenda for the year ahead. These speeches are forward-looking, communicating general priorities as well as specific measures that the executive intends to address in the following year (e.g. Cohen 1995; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Breeman et al. 2009; Jennings et al. n.d.) . Such speeches articulate the government agenda, prioritise some issues ahead of others and are intended to lead to a corresponding set of policy outputs. in the forthcoming year. By highlighting certain issues and ignoring others, the Speech from the Throne provides an annual platform for government to shape the policy agenda (see Jennings, Bevan and John, n.d.) .
The unification of executive and legislative powers in Britain's Westminster system, combined with its longstanding tradition of party discipline, means a close link between manifesto pledges, the legislative proposals of governing parties and policy outputs exists (Bara 2005) . The speech also enables government to 'go public' (Kernell 1997; Canes-Wrone 2001; , either to set the tone of national debate over a particular issue or to highlight promises that it intends to later claim credit for (Strøm 2000; 2001; Bara 2005 
Government, Credible Commitment and Policy Priorities
The Speech from the Throne is a costly signal. The policy agenda set out in the speech creates future potential costs for the prime minister and the government if the priorities in the speech were not followed by policy outputs. In this way, the speech ties the government's hands to the agenda expressed in the speech and conveys a credible signal to their party, the rest of parliament, and the public that this set of issues will be dealt with. By mentioning policies in the speech it can be difficult for the government to back down from its agenda without paying some political cost that may jeopardize its ability to hold power (see Fearon 1997; Kernell 1997; CanesWrone 2001; . Given that the speech also contains many manifesto commitments, not following the agenda may alienate sections of the party and create problems for the leadership. Because of these costs, the government wants the policy agenda presented in the Speech from the Throne to translate directly into policy outputs in the form of Acts of Parliament. In this way the speech acts as a form of credible commitment (North and Weingast 1989) forcing the governing party to stick to its agenda or risk damaging its reputation and political authority.
The Speech from the Throne is a political mechanism for British government to highlight its policy priorities (Jennings, Bevan and John n.d.) , as well as to respond to public opinion . Not defining priorities and not delivering on its agenda can both damage the impression of the government with the electorate and make it easily assailable by its political opponents. As Laver observes, "…If party leaders cannot deliver on commitments that their parties will behave in certain ways, then the entire system of parliamentary government has the potential to become chaotic and unpredictable" (1999: 11). The electorate are known to punish government for failure to perform (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Anderson 1995) . Far better is to gain a reputation as a strong government that retains its priorities and implements its programme, but this is a balancing act and only promises likely to be fulfilled are also likely to be made (Strøm 2000; 2001; Bara 2005; Cohen 1995; . This process of credit-taking is not unique to parliaments and prime ministers either, as presidents also often choose to go public to claim a desired outcome (Kernell 1997; CanesWrone 2001; . In a unitary system, it is even more important to act credibly, since there is no other branch of government to deflect blame onto if policy priorities are not acted upon (e.g. Anderson 1995) . Further, electoral mandates in the UK and in the US have been shown to lead policy programmes to be translated into policy outputs (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; 1992) .
Keeping the agenda of government on track also serves a wider purpose. The notions of government accountability and transparency are at the heart of the democratic ideal. Representative government depends on the public being responsive to what government actually does (Wlezien 1995; and citizens holding government accountable (Strøm 2000) . This is the essence of responsible party government (Ranney 1954) upon which parties seek to take control of policy in the legislature (Cox and McCubbins 2005) , and from which they seek an electoral reward.
Democracy is about the mandate that electors place on parties to implement their
preferences: "what distinguishes democracy from benevolent despotism are precisely the institutional mechanisms for ensuring a necessary correspondence between government policy and individual preferences" (Budge and McDonald 2005: 4) .
In theory, then, credible commitment implies a high degree of transmission of the policy agenda contained in the Speech from the Throne into Acts of Parliament.
On average the relationship between the policy priorities contained in the speech and acts should be strong, with the policy programme presented in the executive speech mirrored by subsequent legislative outputs. For example, a speech that prioritises the economy would be expected to lead to a series of legislative outputs that also prioritise the economy. This expectation of credible commitments and agenda transmission in the Westminster system is due to the power of the prime minister who leads the party with a monopoly of power over the legislature and with powers of appointment. Typically a single party wins a majority in the general election and the governments of the UK have been historically strong (Cox 1987; Strøm 2000) . The transmission of the agenda from the speech to laws will never be absolute because of the timing of the legislative process and the emergence of new issues on the political agenda (Goodin 1982; . Events and public opinion may also shift the necessary legislative outputs in a given year away from the policy priorities and commitments made at the start of a parliamentary session.
Change in British Politics
Besides those ever-present influences, the relationship between the speech and legislative outputs has changed in line with developments in British politics.
Historically, British political parties tended to be centralised with control by elites over their members and their representatives flying the party flag (McKenzie 1955) .
This has however declined over time with party whips exercising less control than they did in the past. The cohesiveness of parties trying to push their legislation through parliament has weakened since the 1970s (Norton 1975; 1978; 1980) , partly due to MPs gaining the habit of rebelling (Cowley 1999; . Studies also suggest that ministers do not have total control over their departments due to the growth in what government does, if not necessarily a decline in executive power (Mueller 1987; Huber 2000) . The growth of complexity of government, both in the details of laws in and the number of issues government attends to (Heclo 1980) along with the demands of a globalised economy, may have reduced the control that executives have over policy. The expansion of the activities of interest groups politics and the growth in the venues for policy-making, such as the European Union (Richardson 2000) , may be another explanation. On the other hand, it is possible that the power of the executive has increased alongside prime ministerial powers (Foley 1993 ) and because of ministerial activism.
The Divergence of Political Parties in Britain
Over the last hundred years both parties have become more internally differentiated and less susceptible to rule by a centralising clique, but these long-term shifts have led Labour and the Conservatives to govern in different ways (McKenzie 1955; Beer 1965; Kavanagh 1985; Ware 1992) . The Labour Party has evolved from being a party focused on a social movement and a clear programme of social and economic reform to more of a catch-all party pursuing a more comprehensive party platform. Labour has adapted to the concerns of British society and government over time, pursuing a more comprehensive policy programme compared to its formation (Pelling 1996) . Furthermore, the historical roots of Labour Party as a mass social movement has influenced development of an adaptive approach to government with the party focused more on accommodating public preferences rather than shaping them over time (Hay 1994; Smith 1994 ).
The Conservative Party evolved from a Victorian era party where government was smaller and less complex, dealing with fewer issues, into modern political party facing a wide assortment of issues (Blake 1985) . Sweeping reforms concerning the social welfare state have changed the nature of government and the increasing technicalities of policy-making are both changes to which the Conservatives adapted.
The Conservative Party had laid claim to the mantle of being the 'natural' party of British government until the breakdown of the post-war consensus (Kavanagh 1987; Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Marquand 1988 ) and has since pursued more concentrated policy programmes under the reforming governments of Thatcher aimed at shaping public preferences (Hay 2007) . The Conservative Party has maintained its hierarchical structure and deferential political tradition that values delivering on their policy programmes (Ludlam and Smith 1995) .
Hypotheses
The importance of credible commitment and the effect of political changes on political parties generate two hypotheses about the link between the Speech from the Throne (priorities) and Acts of the UK Parliament (outputs).
The first of these two hypotheses states that due to the institutional power of the prime minister and cabinet, and the nature of the Westminster system the relationship between the Speech from the Throne and Acts of the UK Parliament should be strong. This suggests that the policy priorities put forward in the speech are a good, but imperfect, predictor of the legislative outputs in the parliamentary year following the speech.
H1: Policy priorities indicated in the Speech from the Throne are transmitted into a number of corresponding Acts of the UK Parliament.
Over time, British politics and government has become more complex, with the introduction of new issues, greater inclusion of various actors (interest groups, the EU), and ever more technical legislation. These changes have led to a more complex system of government, but as we discussed above the parties have reacted differently to these changes. 3 The Conservative Party evolved into a modern political party with a strong hierarchy focused on implementing its agenda and we expect its governments to more effectively transmit its policy priorities mentioned in the speech into acts over time. In contrast, as Labour has become more of a catch all party concerned with responding to public preferences and events we expect the policy priorities presented by Labour governments in the speech to have become harder follow through on over time.
H2a:
The rate of transmission of Conservatives' priorities expressed in the Speech from the Throne into Acts of the UK Parliament increases over time. 
Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses, we use data from the UK Policy Agendas Project (T) * 19 major topics (n)) observations. 7 The pooled time series cross-sectional design also allows for the estimation of the autoregressive nature and trend in acts over time.
By using parliamentary sessions rather than calendar years, the occasional occurrence of multiple sessions in a single year do not affect the analysis.
The model used in this paper to test the relationship between the Speech from the Throne and Acts of the UK Parliament takes the following form:
The dependent variable used for this papers analyses is Acts of the UK Parliament (Acts it ), specifically acts by policy topic, parliamentary year. For example, the number of acts on healthcare in the 30 th session in the dataset is one observation, as is the number of acts on healthcare in the 31 st , and so is the number of acts on Defence in the 31 st , and so forth. The aggregated acts measure was generated from the UK Agendas Project database of Acts of the UK Parliament. Two researchers blind- 6 The use of a pooled analysis most closely fits the question and theory put forth in this paper. As the paper asks how well the priorities expressed in the Speech from the Throne are kept, which suggests pooling, and not how well government keeps its commitments on social welfare separate from housing and other issues. While a concern with this strategy is the exclusion of issue specific controls or events, such as the unemployment rate for macro-economics or wars for international affairs the use of separate models issue area models would still not allow for these additional controls if comparisons between issue areas were to be made. Acts of Parliament themselves follow a stochastic process where randomness and uncertainty are inherent to legislative enactment of the government agenda due to the complexity of the policy environment. This means that events are just as likely to cause increases or decreases in rates of transmission across all topics, so if acts follow a stochastic process then events do not introduce systematic bias into their enactment. The omission of events or socio-economic variables from our model therefore increases the standard errors of our estimates but otherwise does not affect the results. 7 Note that while one hundred and one parliamentary years exist during this period, that only one hundred parliamentary years are used for the analyses due to the lagged dependent variable which requires that the first year be dropped from the analyses.
coded each act from their long and short-title and assigned a single major topic code. Often this unit of analysis is identifiable from the use of punctuation, though it is possible for sentences to include multiple references to policy content (in particular those which address a series of major policy issues in a list).
an interaction term or terms as the underlying relationship is modified by the other factors expressed in the hypothesis. To test whether the transmission from the speech to acts has changed over time and has done so differently for the parties, the model includes a three-way multiplicative interaction term between the Speech from the in the first parliamentary session in our time span (1911) , and counts to 101 in the last 14 A split the sample using dummy variable is often used in place of interactions to test conditional hypotheses as it is easier to interpret directly. However, splitting our dataset in this way through the Conservative Party variable would lead to a series of non-random gaps in the time series as only one party is in government at any point in time. Each half of the sample would therefore contain gaps that would need to be addressed in the time series modelling. Techniques that deal with such gaps assume a linear trend over gaps. However, we know that this if not the case with our, as during these gaps another party with a different rate of transmission between the speech and acts is in power. Therefore, use of a split sample would at the very least produce biased estimates. 15 The model excludes an interaction between time and Conservative, theoretically assuming this value to be 0 as there is no systematic pattern in the number of acts based on the party in power. Excluding this constitutive term is acceptable from a methodological standpoint as it does not directly modify the calculation of the marginal affects their standard errors. Additionally, including this term in the model does not affect the inferences gained from the statistical analyses. Parliamentary years do not exactly match calendar years, with multiple speeches sometimes occurring within the same year which is the cause of this difference between the number of parliamentary years and calendar years during this period. 17 Other coding options for party we also investigated, including dummies for each party with Conservative omitted, and a left to right variable, with parties coded from -1 to 1 according to their relative positioning on the liberal to conservative dimension. Both of these of these options were unsatisfactory and their inclusion or exclusion did not alter the other findings presented in this paper, leading to alterations in coefficients, but not signs or significances. Furthermore, a version of the analysis excluding the liberal governments from 1911-1922 led to the same inferences. 0 otherwise. Following a similar logic, parliamentary years just before an election tend to be shorter than normal as elections often happen in the spring months. As a result, there is less time to pass legislation which likely reduces the average number of acts in those years. To control for this, the model includes a pre-election variable (Preelection t ) that takes the value of 1 for parliamentary sessions just before an election and 0 otherwise.
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The two World Wars are major events in this period. During their conduct policy outputs altered fundamentally, not only for defence, but also for other policy fields, such as labour and welfare, with many changes to British government society occurring during this time. As Figure 1 shows the war periods generally experienced a higher than average number of acts. The model therefore includes a dummy variable (War t ), coded as 1 during wartime (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) and 0 otherwise.
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The dataset includes three special short sessions. Special short sessions occur when parliament reopens for a specific purpose rather than for a full session. Two given year is the number of acts on healthcare in the previous year. Like most autoregressive processes, the transmission will not be perfect and only a percentage of acts in the previous year should transmit to the current year. This is especially true as breaks in government generally weaken the strength of that relationship, although they do not break it, as events and other matters of context will mean that any government will often have to face the same issues as their predecessor (Jennings and John n.d.) . This suggests that a lagged dependent variable will better fit the model than an AR(1) process simply because a lagged dependent variable accounts for history of the series beyond a single previous period. 21 Therefore, we include a lagged acts variable (Acts it-1 ) in the model to control and test for the autoregressive nature of acts. Table 1 presents the results for the time series cross-sectional models using the different speech variables.
Results
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[insert Table 1 about here]
The positive and significant coefficient for the Speech it in both versions of the analysis presented in Table 1 Mentions. Dropping these panels from data and running the analyses on the remaining cases did not alter the signs or significances of the results. 23 The Speech it variable is the effect of the speech on acts for non-Conservative governments not accounting for change over time. The Speech it variable minus the (Speech * Conservative) it interaction represents the effect of the speech on acts for Conservative governments also not accounting for change over time. The (Speech * Time) it interaction shows the change in the speech acts relationship over time for non-Conservative governments. Similarly, the (Speech * Time * Conservative) it interaction shows the change in the speech acts relationship over time for Conservative governments. Both Figures 2 and 3 show that the average effect of the speech declines over time. The decline is slightly sharper in the legislative version of the analysis which also has a greater average effect overall. The marginal effects for both analyses remain significant for most of time span (indicated by the 95% confidence intervals), with the only exceptions being early on during a Conservative government in the All 24 These effects were calculated by taking the coefficient for the Speech it variable in each sample minus the coefficient for the (Speech * Time) it interaction which is multiplied by each parliamentary year in those years without a Conservative government. In those years with Conservatives in power the (Speech * Conservative) it interaction plus the (Speech * Time * Conservative) it , which is multiplied by each parliamentary year, is added to the previous value. This produces the dynamic marginal effects over time and by party. Calculation of the 95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines)for Figures 2 and 3 is more difficult to explain verbally, but is done following the formulas laid out by Brambor et al (2006) where the standard deviation is the square root of the variance-covariance matrix of the Speech variable and the three constitutive terms. The resulting number is then multiplied by 2 and -2 to calculate the upper and lower confidence bands respectively.
Mathematically in relation to the model as presented in the data section, the calculation of the marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals can be expressed as follows:
Mentions series, and during the most recent years in both cases indicated by the confidence bands dropping below 0.
Combined, Figures 2 and 3 and the results in Table 1 present the tests and offer a visual explanation of hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b. To interpret these results fully with regard to each hypothesis it is best to turn to the marginal effects presented in Figures 2 and 3 . For the purposes of this discussion we focus on Figure 3 and the Legislative Mentions analysis presented in Table 1 , although the same interpretation can be made for the All Mentions analysis. In Figure 3 , the marginal effects of the speech on acts are positive throughout the time span and are statistically significant for all but the last four parliamentary years of data. This offers support for hypothesis 1, that there is a positive and significant relationship between the speech and acts.
More important than the level of statistical significance is the strength of these results.
As the transmission of the policy agenda of the speech to acts is conditional, changing over time and by party, the size of the effect cannot be discussed through a single coefficient value. It is best illustrated by the marginal effects presented in Figure 3 . Finally, our analyses demonstrate that the degree of transmission of the agenda from speech mentions to acts is stronger when considering just the legislative section of the Speech from the Throne for the entire period between 1911 and 2008 (see Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3) . The large increase in the effect of the speech variable and the interaction terms are most likely because the legislative section of the Speech from the Throne refers to specific legislative intentions for the following session.
Moreover, the model using only legislative mentions explains more variance the model using all mentions suggesting it is the more appropriate model specification.
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The differences in results of these alternative specifications suggest that the legislative section of the speech is key source of transmission to acts of parliament, not the content of the speech in its entirety.
Conclusion
There is a relationship between the Speech from the Throne and Acts of the UK Parliament, but it is not as strong or as historically stable as the classic 25 Note that the coefficient estimates for other variables included in the model for all mentions (see Table 1 ) also change when compared against the model for legislative mentions only. For example, the effect of lagged acts is weaker, which can be explained due to the increase in explanatory power of the speech variable and interaction terms. This paper considers how the relationship between the speech and acts changes over time both generally and by party. While there is some evidence of a general decline in the relationship between the Speech from the Throne and Acts of the UK Parliament, the stronger inference is that this decline has been party specific.
Labour and other governments have experienced a general decline in this relationship, while Conservative governments have had a gradual upward trend. While the evidence of these party differences is strong and robust, the exact reason or reasons why the parties have moved in different directions in their ability to maintain the priorities mentioned in the Speech from the Throne is not clear. As this paper has noted, many factors may explain the change in these party specific trends. In particular, changes to internal party organisation provide a plausible account of this changing degree of transmission over time. Labour has evolved from a single issue party to a centrist party concerned with public and media opinion, while historically the Conservatives have adapted from being a Victorian era party in a period when the legislative agenda addressed fewer issues, modernising to pursue a more ideological legislative programme concerned with shaping public opinion and setting the political agenda. For example, this explanation is consistent with popular characterisations of the governing styles of the Thatcher government, pursuing a focused programme of reform despite opposition, and that of the Blair government, with its sofa-style cabinet and preoccupation with media management. This paper has offered a general explanation for these findings, but this requires further research into the reasons why this pattern exists.
More broadly this paper has highlighted important methodological and theoretical points concerning political parties and their policy programmes.
Methodologically, the paper has demonstrated that there are significant party differences in the UK concerning the degree to which the Labour and Conservative parties enact the priorities in the Speech from the Throne in terms of Acts of the UK Parliament, but that this difference is dynamic in nature. While it is possible to observe a significant difference between the parties during certain time periods, the largest difference between the parties is in the changing strength of the relationship between the speech and acts over time. Other studies, particularly those using time series data that postulate party differences, should take care to consider if those differences are dynamic. Political parties change over time and so does the environment in which they operate.
Our findings concerning the differences over time in the degree to which the legislative agenda of political parties are transmitted into legislative outputs do not, however, inform normative claims regarding whether higher or lower degrees of transmission indicate a more efficient or responsive functioning of democracy. For instance, a government that is more sensitive to changes in public opinion, events or the media might be considered responsive, but also may find it more difficult to implement its legislative agenda. There are, however, trade-offs between enacting an agenda and responding to events or other external forces. Finding a middle ground between shaping and accommodating policy, between acting as a trustee and a delegate is likely the most desirable option. 
